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INFORMING WORKERS OF THE RIGHT TO WORKPLACE
REPRESENTATION: REASONABLY MOVING FROM THE
MIDDLE OF THE HIGHWAY TO THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY
G. MICAH WISSINGER*

INTRODUCTION
An oft forgotten and disregarded fundamental promise to
American workers is the right to self-representation in the workplace
conferred by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”
or “the Act”).1 Section 7 gives employees “the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations. . . .”2 This
right has been forgotten in large part because, while belonging to the
employee, it can only gain effect through the accommodation of an
agent on employer property, the union organizer.3 Through various
agency decisions and court holdings, the basic section 7 right of an
employee to receive information about workplace representation has
been narrowed4 to the point of relegating unions to unreasonable and
ineffective methods of communication.
The requirements of the Act inject a measure of rivalry into the
choice for workplace representation by requiring a secret ballot
* J.D. Northeastern University School of Law, 2002; B.A. Oklahoma City University,
1999. The author is a Legal Fellow with the Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO
in Washington, DC. He wishes to thank Professor Ira Sills for his inspiration, Professor Karl
Klare for his commitment to teaching and helpful suggestions for this article, and Professor Kim
Dulin for her valuable assistance. The author also wishes to thank his family, Ms. Elizabeth
Gazay, and Mr. Asan Askin for continued encouragement and support.
1. Id. §§ 151–169 (1998).
2. See id. § 157. The Act defines a “labor organization” to be “any organization of any
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
3. Cynthia Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV.
305, 325–27 (1994); Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Labor Law Access Rules and Stare
Decisis: Developing A Planned Parenthood-Based Model of Reform, 20 BERKLEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 138, 143–44 (1999).
4. Estlund, supra note 3, at 311–21.
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election when a question concerning representation cannot be
resolved between the parties.5 However, the contentious nature of
representation elections has become more pronounced in the dissemination of pre-election campaign information, resulting in a
competition between employers and unions rather than an exercise in
accommodation.6 One way that the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB” or “the Board”) and reviewing courts have furthered the
pre-election contest rivalry for information is by awarding remedies
to unions as a way to “balance” the gross inadequacies of access to
workers. The Board seems to forget, however, that section 7 gives
rights to workers and not to unions or employers. A “remedy” to the
imbalance of access was announced in Excelsior Underwear Inc.,7
which requires that the names and addresses of workers be given to
unions so that they can visit workers at their homes instead of on
employer property.8
Arguments for reforming the rules of access, specifically the doctrine laid out in Excelsior, are far from novel.9 One way to achieve

5. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1). A question concerning representation exists when a labor
organization or individual seeks recognition as a bargaining agent and the employer refuses to
grant recognition; the statute does not require the parties to use the formal processes of the
NLRB. However, section 9 provides a framework for formal election procedure. 1 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 376 (Patrick Harding et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW].
6. Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and
Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 497 (1993). Becker outlines the origins of the
contest theory of the representation election in the context of free speech rights. Id. at 547–61.
He concludes, “the right to [workplace] representation has been subverted by lawmakers’
interpretation of industrial democracy in terms of an analogy between political and union
elections—an analogy that suggests a theory of the union election as a contest between union
and employer.” Id. at 602.
7. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1245 (1966) (citing prior Board decisions regarding access as
determinative). Excelsior also cites the “employer’s interest in controlling property” as
significant. Id. at 1245.
8. Id. at 1241 (stating that “access of all employees . . . can be insured only if all parties
have the names and addresses of all the voters.”).
9. See, e.g., Leonard Bierman, Extending Excelsior, 69 IND. L.J. 521, 524–25 (1994)
[hereinafter Bierman, Reply] (replying to White’s article); Leonard Bierman, Toward a New
Model For Union Organizing: The Home Visits Doctrine and Beyond, 27 B.C. L. REV. 1, 28–30
(1985) [hereinafter Bierman, Home Visits] (setting forth the home visits doctrine and arguing it
is an ineffectual trade-off in access to workers); Gely & Bierman, supra note 3, at 180–81
(proposing reform in labor law access rules); David Greenhaus, Should the NLRB Revisit
Excelsior?, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 259, 273–77 (1998) (arguing for reform of private
sector Excelsior doctrine in light of the contrary rule applied to public sector employees through
the Privacy Act); Martin H. Malin, Labor Law Reform: Waiting for Congress, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 277, 281 (1994) (suggesting that adjudicatory rulemaking should reshape Excelsior);
Randall J. White, Union Representation Election Reform: Equal Access and the Excelsior Rule,
67 IND. L. J. 129, 160–66 (1991) (proposing an extensive overhaul of the Excelsior doctrine).
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meaningful communication with employees is to insert a neutral party
into the competition for representation election access. That neutral
party would be technology.
There has been a substantial amount of recent scholarship suggesting methods for the incorporation of technology into representation elections.10 Most articles regarding the incorporation of e-mail
and the Internet have revolved around employer rights in their
corporate e-mail systems vis á vis the doctrines of workplace and
work time solicitation and distribution.11 Scarce, if any, comment has
been made about incorporating technology into the reform of nonwork time organizing options and the Excelsior doctrine itself, this
Note sets forth such a proposal.
This Note primarily focuses on a reform of Excelsior using private e-mail accounts and Internet web sites. It is premised on the
previously articulated presumption that the Excelsior doctrine serves
as an incomplete remedy to the rules for union access to workers, and
also on the idea that an extensive overhaul of the doctrine of representation elections is preferable to any partial reform.12
Section I of this Note provides background on the rules of access,
specifically Excelsior, its informational aim, and the “home visits
doctrine.” Section II sets forth the argument for reform and provides
a proposal for using private e-mail and Internet web sites as modes of
communication in the representation election. Section III provides a
case example that highlights the need for reform and shows the utility
of technology as the communication means in representation elections.

10. See Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Susan S.
Robfogel, Electronic Communication and the NLRA: Union Access and Employer Rights, 16
LAB. L.J. 231 (2000); Gwynne A. Wilcox, Section 7 Rights of Employees and Union Access to
Employees: Cyber Organizing, 16 LAB. L.J. 253 (2000); Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)Workers’
Rights: the NLRA and Employee Electronic Communications, 105 YALE L.J. 1639 (1996).
11. See Fredrick D. Rapone, Jr., Comment, This Is Not Your Grandfather’s Labor Union—
Or is it? Exercising Section 7 Rights in the Cyberspace Age, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 657 (2001); Cheryl
M. Stanton, Comment, Organizing Online: Union Solicitation on Employers’ E-Mail Systems,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 653 (1996).
12. See Gely & Bierman, supra note 3 (arguing for an extensive overhaul of the representation election and rejecting the “piecemeal” approach resulting from stare decisis).
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BACKGROUND

The NLRA charges the NLRB with administering and enforcing
most private-sector American labor policy,13 which theoretically
fosters industrial peace and workplace harmony through collective
bargaining.14 To this end, a process must first play out in the representation election—a process not normally characterized as peaceful.15 It is often the work of the NLRB to lend dignity to
representation elections through the enactment and enforcement of
procedures designed to balance the interests of employees and
employers while, at the same time, accommodating unions in their
attempt to supply employees with the information necessary to make
an informed decision for workplace representation.16
A. Access Generally
It is outside the scope of this Note to give extensive treatment to
each of the limitations placed on workplace and work time organizing, but for ease of discussion, the rules can be broken into four
factors.17 First, the status of the organizer as an employee or nonemployee is often crucial to determining the treatment and protection
ultimately provided by a reviewing court.18 Timing is also an important factor because there is a general presumption to protect nonwork-time organizing.19 The third factor in determining access rights

13. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1998).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also Peter Levine, The Legitimacy of Labor Unions, 18 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 529, 531 (2001) (citing NLRA text and undertaking a comprehensive moral critique of
modern labor relations).
15. E.g., J. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY
(1976) (examining the effects of fiercely contested representation elections). But see Paul
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1782 (1983) (disagreeing with Getman et al. in their methodology and
their conclusion that the effects of illegal employer tactics do not affect the outcome of
representation elections).
16. Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 53–54 (1964) (arguing for imposing
legal constraints in elections to preserve the implicit goal of fairness).
17. E.g., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 5, at 87–104.
18. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533 (1992) (banning nonemployee union
organizers from employer owned property is permissible); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (permitting ban on nonemployee union organizers where other methods of
communication are available).
19. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (holding that employers may
exert control over property to limit organizing from interfering with safety or production); see
also id. at 803 n.10 (citing the Peyton Packing presumption that “work time is for work”).
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centers on the location of the organizing activity.20 The final factor,
which often warrants different treatment depending on the context
established by the other three factors, is whether to characterize the
organization actions as solicitation or distribution.21
Section 7 says nothing of the rights of unions or employers.
However, their respective interests in the representation election
became a permanent part of the section 7 discourse in NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co.22 The Babcock Court resolved a split in the
circuits over the treatment of nonemployee union organizers distributing union literature in employer owned parking lots.23 The resulting
decision provided for an accommodation of interests rather than an
absolute upholding of employee section 7 rights.24 The Court stated
that “[o]rganization rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little
destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other.”25
The Court acknowledged that the right to self-organization under the Act depended, to some degree, on the “ability of employees

20. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 621 (1962) (banning solicitation and
distribution in work areas held permissible because of litter and threats to production).
Additional restraints are often imposed on hospital and retail workers. Beth Israel Hosp. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) (needing to provide “tranquil atmosphere” as reason to prohibit
organizing); May Dep’t Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797, 803 (1962), enforcement denied, 316 F.2d
797 (6th Cir. 1963) (prohibiting discussion of union matters on the retail floor).
21. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 797–98 (dealing with solicitation); Stoddard-Quirk, 138
N.L.R.B. at 619–20 (recognizing solicitation and distribution of literature are different
“techniques” and holding that work areas should be free from distribution). For a review of the
distinctions to be drawn between solicitation and distribution see Bok, supra note 16, at 92–96.
22. 351 U.S. 105. In Babcock, the Court held that employers could prevent nonemployee
union organizers from entering their parking lots. Id. at 113–14. The employer’s plants were
located near small towns and a large percentage of employees lived in these nearby towns, thus
the Court reasoned that there were other methods of distributing information to these
employees, and the plant owners could not be required to allow nonemployee union organizers
to distribute literature in the parking lots. Id. at 107–08, 113. Employer property rights had
already been recognized in Republic Aviation, yet not in the context of preventing nonemployee
access. 324 N.L.R.B. 793.
23. 351 U.S. 105. In three cases the Board found that employers had committed unfair
labor practices by refusing to allow union organizers access to company parking lots. The Fifth
and Tenth Circuits denied enforcement of the Board’s orders and the Sixth Circuit granted
enforcement. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485 (1954), enforcement denied, 222 F.2d
316 (5th Cir. 1955); Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24 (1954), enforcement denied, 222 F.2d 858
(10th Cir. 1955); Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 998 (1954), enforced, 222 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1955).
24. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
25. Id.
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to learn the advantages of self-organization from others.”26 Thus, the
Court created an exception stating:
[t]he employer may not affirmatively interfere with organization;
the union may not always insist that the employer aid organization.
But, when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the
reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them
through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has
been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of information on the right to organize. The determination of
the proper adjustments rests with the Board.27

Babcock created this “reasonable means to communication” exception, but the Court held that it did not apply to the situation facing
the Babcock union organizers.28 The Court stated that the union
could adequately inform workers of their right to self-organization
without entering the employers’ parking lots.29 The Court based
much of its reasoning on the fact that most of the employees lived in
small towns close to the plants, drove to work, and parked in
company-owned lots.30 These lots were accessible only by driving
down a company-owned driveway. The Court said the organizers
could communicate with employees at the driveway gates.31 However, the Board previously concluded that the traffic conditions at the
driveway entrance made it “practically impossible for union organizers to distribute leaflets safely to employees in motors as they enter or
leave the lot.”32 Despite the practical difficulties in communication,
the Court held that there were still readily available methods of
communication for the union to utilize, without expanding on what
those methods were.33
B.

Excelsior

Most of the modern rules of representation campaign access
were in place when Professor Derek Bok offered suggestions for a
more stable approach to this area of the law in 1964.34 A case that
26. Id. at 113.
27. Id. at 112.
28. Id. at 113.
29. Id. at 113.
30. Id. at 106–08, 113.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 107.
33. Id. at 113.
34. See Bok, supra note 16. According to the Westlaw database, Bok’s article has been
cited by the Supreme Court six times, by lower courts in seventy-two decisions, and quoted by
the Board in thirty-seven decisions (as of Jan. 7, 2002).
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grew out of the times was Excelsior Underwear Inc.,35 which marked
an end to at least one facet of the problems cited by Bok as undermining the election process:36 the inability of unions to reach workers
with section 7 information during nonwork time.37
Excelsior required “higher standards of disclosure” by mandating
that seven days after a representation election is set, employers must
provide the Board with an “Excelsior list” that includes the names
and addresses of all members of the proposed bargaining unit.38 The
union may then request the list and the failure or refusal of an employer to supply the list is grounds for setting aside the election.39 The
right of a union to receive an Excelsior list was upheld by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.40 This edict has remained virtually unchanged since 1969.
Although not often
distinguishable, two of Excelsior’s goals were to provide section 7
information to employees and to provide balance in the contest for
access to employees. The informational goal can be found in the
Excelsior decision itself.41 The balance of access theory is a result of a
group of decisions collectively referred to as the home visits doctrine.42
1.

Informational Aim

Central to the reasoning in Excelsior was the much-extolled belief that an informed electorate, possessing all the relevant information, will make the superior choice when confronted with a decision
for workplace representation.43 The Board asserted that, among
other factors, a lack of information impedes free choice in an election.44 Through the new rule announced in Excelsior, the Board
sought to “remove the impediment to communication” by helping

35. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). In this case, the Board refers to Bok as a “thoughtful
commentator” and cites him for the idea of giving contact information to unions. Id. at 1242
n.18.
36. Bok suggests that the Board adopt policies that would withstand “the vicissitudes of
changing attitudes and administrations.” Bok, supra note 16, at 39.
37. Id. at 99–100.
38. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239–40.
39. Id. at 1240.
40. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
41. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1240–41.
42. See infra notes 51–56 and accompanying text.
43. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1242.
44. Id. at 1240.
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unions disseminate information during nonwork time.45 It explicitly
recognized that an employer, through ostensible property rights, has
an inherent advantage in communicating its views on union organizing efforts.46 As such, the need for “prompt disclosure”47 of an
address list seemed the “obvious” remedy to the lack of access union
organizers faced in reaching workers.48
Implicit in Excelsior is the fact that the list is not designed to directly help unions, but to permit voting employees to make informed
decisions.49 Cases involving Excelsior lists continue to come before
the Board for determination. The standard language in a case
concerning a dispute over an Excelsior list confirms the central role of
the list as providing information to the employee. The language
reads: “[t]o ensure that all eligible voters have the opportunity to be
informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to vote,
all parties to the election should have access to a list of voters and
their addresses that may be used to communicate with them.”50
The Excelsior decision analogizes to other types of elections in
which voter contact information is a commodity, such as political
elections, stockholder elections, and elections for union office.51
Some critics have challenged this analogy, particularly as it applies to
political elections.52 However, for the purposes of this Note, the
validity of this analogy is presumed as evidence of the intent to
inform the worker-electorate of their section 7 right to representation.

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1239.
48. Id. at 1241.
49. Were the goal of Excelsior to help the union, the list would be made available before it
was required to garner enough support from the electorate to be able to file for an election. See
Bierman, Reply, supra note 9, at 524; see also STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG & JUDITH A, SCOTT,
ORGANIZING AND THE LAW, 211 (4th ed. 1991); infra note 62.
50. Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1236; N.L.R.B. v. Wyman-Gordan Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
51. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1242.
52. Becker, supra note 6, at 516–24 (examining the “common democratic vernacular,” and
arguing that “conflation” with political elections “mask[s] the disparity of power” that
motivated passage of the NLRA); Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation
Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 436–55 (1995) (arguing
against the “Bokian” conceptualization of the representation election as analogous to the
political); Weiler, supra note 15, at 1813–15.
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Home Visits Doctrine

The same day the Board handed down Excelsior, it announced in
General Electric Co. that it would resist making other changes to the
procedures of representation elections until the effects of Excelsior
became known.53 General Electric involved a challenge to the practice
of employer “captive audience” speeches, a method of communication denied to unions.54 The holdings of Excelsior and General Electric, coupled with two 1957 cases involving a union’s right to approach
employees in their homes during representation campaigns,55 resulted
in what is called the “home visits doctrine.”56
For over fifteen years, Professor Leonard Bierman has led the
debate over the home visits doctrine, focusing on its sheer ineffectiveness and concern for employee privacy rights in the home.57
Professor Bierman suggests that the Excelsior doctrine and the
derivative home visits doctrine operate under a “tremendous imbalance in organization opportunities.”58 A union is not entitled to an
Excelsior list until seven days after a representation election has been
scheduled,59 yet a representation election cannot be scheduled without a showing of interest of 30 percent of the employees in the unit
petitioning for election.60 This has led to additional criticism of
53. Gen. Electric. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247, 1251 (1966). The employer held a “captive
audience” speech during work time and denied the union the right to be present at the meeting.
Id. Professor Bierman details this line of cases and states that General Electric was a test case
attempting to overturn the precedent set forth in Livingston Shirt which denied unions the right
to speak at an employer’s speech to employees. Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 7. The
Board in General Electric avoided examining the captive speech precedent by citing to Excelsior
as “an increased opportunity for employees’ access to communications.” Gen. Electric., 156
N.L.R.B. at 1251; Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 7.
54. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1250. Unions have no right to reply to a captive audience speech.
Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 409 (1953).
55. Plant City Welding & Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131, 133–34 (1957) (allowing unions to
visit employee homes), overruled on other grounds by Harborside Healthcare, Inc. v. NLRB,
230 F.3d 206 (6th Cir, 2000); Peoria Plastics Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 546 (1957) (finding employer
home visits per se coercive); see also, e.g., Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 7–9 (discussing
Peoria Plastics, Plant City Welding, Excelsior, and General Electric as the basis of the home
visits doctrine).
56. Professor Bierman adopted the phrase in his article examining this line of cases. It
serves as a method of referring to these four cases, which when read together, imply that unions
will visit employees in their homes to communicate section 7 information. See Bierman, Home
Visits, supra note 9.
57. Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9; Bierman, Reply, supra note 9; Gely & Bierman,
supra note 3.
58. Bierman, Reply, supra note 9, at 524.
59. Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239–40.
60. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2001) states in pertinent part that “it being the Board’s
administrative experience that in the absence of special factors the conduct of an election serves
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Excelsior in that it provides “too little, too late” in the way of balance.61 Professor Bierman argues that the timing of the trigger for an
Excelsior list has “contribute[d] to the general ineffectiveness of
union home visits as an organizational ‘balancer.’”62
3.

Prior Reform Suggestions

In 1991, student author Randall White proposed extending Excelsior by making an Excelsior list available before the critical 30
percent prepetition showing of support is garnered for an election.63
His proposed extension of Excelsior was aimed at balancing access for
organizers against employer property.64 However, more than a
decade after White’s proposal to extend Excelsior, little has changed
except for the further entrenchment of employer property rights and
the pushing of organizers further from the meaningful communication
of section 7 rights.65
In the interest of employee privacy, Professor Bierman disagrees
with White’s extension as a matter of degree, yet he agrees with the
proposal in chief. He notes that reform is even more necessary due to
further limitations placed on nonemployee access by the Supreme
Court in Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB.66 Authors Bierman and White offer
numerous suggestions for the reform of Excelsior and both arrive at
the same conclusion–the current standards governing labor representation elections are not effective and are unduly biased in favor of
employers.67
C.

Lechmere: What Remains of Nonemployee Access?

The latest restrictions in nonemployee access to workers came
from the Supreme Court in 1992 in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB.68 The
case involved union organizers trying to solicit workers at a Connectino purpose under the statute unless the petitioner has been designated by at least 30 percent of
the employees.”
61. Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 9; White, supra note 9 (commenting on
Bierman’s article at 27 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1985)); see also Bierman, Reply, supra note 9, at 524–25
(replying to White’s article, supra note 9).
62. Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 9.
63. White, supra note 9, at 161–66.
64. Id.
65. Bierman, Reply, supra note 9, at 522.
66. Id. at 521–22.
67. Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 35; Bierman, Reply, supra note 9 at 532; White,
supra note 9, at 167.
68. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
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cut shopping center.69 They leafleted cars in a publicly accessible
parking lot during times it was believed that employees owned most
of the cars in the lot.70 The employer ousted the organizers from the
public parking lot and they were forced to move their operations to a
nearby grassy area beside busy highway traffic.71 From there they
recorded license plates that they gave to a contact at the Connecticut
Department of Motor Vehicles in an attempt to identify workers for
mailings and home visits.72 The union also placed advertisements in
local newspapers but, despite its efforts, still failed to identify 80
percent of the employees.73
The Board held that it was improper for the employer to exclude
the organizers from the parking lot because there was no other
reasonable means of communication available to inform workers of
their section 7 rights.74 The Supreme Court reversed the Board and
the First Circuit’s affirmation of the Board’s decision,75 holding that
nonemployee union organizers should only be allowed access to an
employer’s property, even a parking lot, when workers are inaccessible to the union through traditional methods of communication.76
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, stated that, although the Board
was given the power to accommodate section 7 rights and property
rights, it had given too much weight to Babcock’s “other reasonable
means of communication exception.”77 The Court held that the
exception was intended to be extremely narrow and that the union
must show “unique obstacles” to communication.78

69. Id. at 529.
70. Id. at 529–30.
71. Id. at 530.
72. Id.
73. Id. The union identified forty-one employees and obtained one signed authorization
card.
74. Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 92, 94 (1988) (adopting the ALJ’s cease and desist order).
75. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1990).
76. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540.
77. Id. at 539–40.
78. Id. at 541. Babcock stated that the exception should apply to workers whose living
quarters place them beyond the reach of the union’s message. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox,
Co., 351 U.S. 102, 113 (1956). Lechmere held this to apply only to very limited situations such as
mining camps, logging camps, and remote mountain resort hotels. 502 U.S. at 539.
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II. REFORM PROPOSAL
A. Lechmere and Reasonableness
The Lechmere Court found that “[a]ccess to employees, not success in winning them over, is the critical issue–although success, or
lack thereof, may be relevant in determining whether reasonable
access exists.”79 Glossed over and possibly altogether forgotten is that
it is not the union’s success in “winning them over” with which the
Court should be concerned, but, rather, the success of maintaining
meaningful accommodation by protecting the right of workers to hear
the union’s message.80 If access resulting in a meaningful balance
were to be achieved, then “success or lack thereof” may or may not
be relevant at all.
Lechmere sparked considerable criticism with its suggestion that
it is reasonable for organizers to communicate with employees by
standing in traffic with signs while recording license plates.81 On this
point, Lechmere signaled an end to any theoretical accommodation of
rights and to any effective communication of section 7 information
resulting from the unreasonably narrowed Babcock exception. While
Lechmere may have signaled an end to nonemployee access to
employer property, new methods of communication can insert
reasonableness into representation elections through the neutral
mediums of private e-mail and the Internet.
B.

Reform Proposal: New Balancers

There are numerous ways for technology and new forms of
communication to transform representation elections. This Note will
limit discussion to readily achievable methods.82 E-mail and the
Internet are fast becoming the preferred methods of communication
and sources of information for millions of Americans. Including
employee private e-mail addresses as part of the Excelsior doctrine or

79. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540–41.
80. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
81. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 543 (White, J., dissenting) (stating it is “unpersuasive to suggest
that the union has sufficient access . . . by being able to hold up signs from a public grassy strip
adjacent to the highway leading to the parking lot”); Bierman, Reply, supra note 9, at 524–25;
Estlund, supra note 3 at 326–33; Story, supra note 52, at 387–88.
82. The reader should keep in mind that there are incalculable permutations to be had with
technological reforms.
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requiring employers to post notice of organizing on web sites are
easily attainable methods of representation election reform. Both
would dramatically enhance the ability of workers to receive section 7
information about workplace representation.
The latest Census Bureau estimates show that as of August 2000,
fifty-four million American households, comprising roughly fifty-one
percent of the population, had one or more computers in the home.83
This figure is up from 42 percent in 1998, reflecting an almost 10
percent increase in two years’ time.84 It is also estimated that more
than two in five households had Internet access in the year 2000,
which represents approximately 44 percent of American households.85
Because of the increased availability of computers, Internet usage
rates are becoming almost synonymous with computer ownership.
This is reflected by the fact that in 2000, more than four of five
households with a computer claimed Internet usage.86
Parties concerned with methods of communication, particularly
unions relegated to unreasonable methods of communication, will or
have already taken notice of these facts.87 In his Lechmere dissent,
Justice White stated that “mere notice that an organizing campaign
exists” is not enough to ensure that workers are aware of their section
7 rights and that “actual communication with nonemployee union
organizers” is necessary “to vindicate section 7 rights.”88 Private email and the Internet can facilitate actual dialogue and give employees more than “mere notice” of a campaign’s existence. Congress, the
Board, and reviewing courts should embrace the opportunity to use
these new methods of communication in representation elections
through reforms in legislation, administrative rulemaking, and
adjudication.

83. U.S. CENSUS STATISTICS Aug. 2000, Home Computers and Internet Usage in the
United States 1–2 fig. 1 (Issued September 2001), available at http://www.census.gov [hereinafter
CENSUS REPORT]. Other sources report even higher rates. For example, one states a rate of
sixty-three percent. Julia Angwin, E-Business: Has Growth of the Net Flattened?, WALL ST. J.,
July 16, 2001, at B1.
84. CENSUS REPORT, supra note 83, at 1–2.
85. Id. In 1997, less than one-half of the households with computers had Internet
connections. Id.
86. Id.
87. E.g., ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, CYBERUNION: EMPOWERING LABOR THROUGH
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY (Daniel J.B. Mitchell ed., 1999) (offering suggestions for the use of
the computer and the Internet by organized labor).
88. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 543 (1992).
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Private E-mail Accounts

In addition to the information currently supplied in an Excelsior
list, private e-mail addresses should be included.89 Extending Excelsior to include private e-mail addresses would likely result in a higher
proportion of employees receiving more timely notice of their section
7 rights. E-mail is an efficient and portable means of communication.
Therefore, including e-mail addresses in Excelsior information offers
unions a faster method of communication than traditional mail
provides. In addition to the speed with which employees could
receive section 7 information, e-mail addresses are not stationary and
could provide an additional method of contact–one that does not
usually change when a person moves to a new residence. This would
increase the likelihood that more employees receive section 7 information because notwithstanding outdated address information, a
union may be able to reach an employee through an e-mail address.
Conceivably, the use of private e-mail could also allow employers
to maintain sovereignty over access to the electronic property of the
corporate e-mail system by lessening the use of corporate e-mail for
organizing.90 If a union has the private e-mail addresses of employees
there will be no need to “hack into” a corporate e-mail system to
obtain corporate e-mail addresses for use in organizing.91 Moreover,
employees are often compelled to use an employer’s e-mail system
while working,92 but there is not usually a compelling reason for
employees to check private e-mail while on the clock. Employers
may assert that the use of private e-mail to conduct organizing will in
fact occur during work time, yet this is an issue internal to the employer. In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Board affirmed a
ruling against an employer who allowed employees to use its e-mail
system to distribute information for non work related topics but had a
ban on using e-mail to distribute union literature.93 If an employer
wants to institute a broad “no private e-mail policy” then, based on

89. Telephone numbers are not currently included. Keeping with this Note’s proposal,
their inclusion should become mandatory.
90. Use of corporate email systems for organizing labor is a growing concern among
employers. Malin and Perritt discuss the ease with which unions can gain access to corporate email systems. See Malin & Perritt, supra note 10, at 39–40.
91. See id.; Stanton, supra note 11 (discussing employers’ concerns about unions obtaining
corporate e-mail addresses).
92. Angwin, supra note 83 (stating that forty-two million workers have internet access at
work, which represents “a twenty-three percent jump in one year”).
93. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
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the reasoning of E.I. du Pont de Nemours, it is required not to discriminatorily enforce such a policy.94
a) Implementation
If an employer has an e-mail system, a union could be allowed a
one-time use of that system to advise employees that representation is
a right they are afforded under the NLRA. The message could
instruct employees to reply to the union with their private e-mail
accounts. In the alternative, existing rules already obligate employers
to facilitate the collection of addresses and names of all members of
the bargaining unit.95 Adding e-mail addresses to the information
supplied in the list would not pose an undue hardship on the employer. The same resources currently used to maintain payroll
information could easily accommodate the change because employees
could be asked at the time of hire to provide a private e-mail account
as a part of their contact information.
b) Avoiding Delay
An important benefit of using private email addresses is that the
union messages are not unnecessarily delayed. Employees would not
have to wait for traditional mailings to be sent through the postal
service before obtaining the information necessary to cultivate an
informed choice for workplace representation. Additionally, the
current method for checking the accuracy of a list causes more
delay.96
Unions are only guaranteed Excelsior information during the
time leading up to an election. In contrast, the employer is able to
campaign during work time and, by virtue of having the information,
can send antiunion letters to employees at home.97 Kate Bronfenbrenner concluded in her study of the effects of employer behavior in
elections that “for every additional letter that the company mails out,

94. Id.; see also Stanton, supra note 11 at 663–64.
95. Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239–40.
96. Schlossberg and Scott suggest that organizers immediately check the accuracy of an
Excelsior list upon receipt. They further suggest that the list be checked by mailing correspondence to the address given by the employer and waiting for returned mail to indicate which
contact information was incorrect. SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 49, at 210.
97. The Board justified its holding in Excelsior based, in part, on the fact that employers
already have employee home addresses for mailings and are able to communicate with
employees at work. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1240.
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the percentage of votes cast for the union declines by 2.5%.”98 Thus,
the practice of requiring unions to inform employees about their right
to representation in a limited amount of time does great injury to the
“laboratory conditions”99 of the election campaign. Adding more
delay through the postal system adds insult to that injury.
Unions must check Excelsior information through trial and error,100 which is an exercise in the inefficient. If addresses supplied in
the list are incorrect, the union must wait at least several days, and
possibly more than a week, for organizational materials to come back
indicating that an incorrect name or address was supplied.101 Even
with the prevalent use of mail forwarding, if an employee no longer
resides at the address provided, the union’s organizational materials
are unnecessarily delayed as they are forwarded. This is simply
inefficient in terms of time, energy, and mailing costs. Providing
organizers with private e-mail addresses would enable the union to
verify the accuracy of an address with the employee before mailing
and allow more employees to receive notice of their section 7 right to
representation.
c) Other Efficiency Concerns
If it is determined that e-mail communication is preferable to
written communication in a given campaign, one electronic message
could be sent to the bargaining unit and the e-mail addresses would
be checked in a matter of minutes by a reply message indicating
which, if any, addresses are incorrect. The organizer would then have
the option to request that the employer supplement the e-mail
address list with correct information or to ask the entire unit, via email, as to whether a correct address is known.102
Perhaps a correct e-mail address, phone number, or traditional
address could be provided for every member of the unit. Giving
employees the option to add a personal e-mail address to the infor98. Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and FirstContract Campaigns, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 82 (Sheldon
Friedman et al. eds., 1994).
99. A discussion of the “laboratory conditions” doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note.
It refers to the pre-election rules that do not rest on unfair labor practice prohibitions. For an
overview of the doctrine see THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 5, at 337–75.
100. SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 49, at 210.
101. Many times employers will not know that information is incorrect, yet some employers
deliberately provide false information. Id. at 212.
102. See Technology Services Solutions, infra notes 125–36 and accompanying text. This is
exactly the inquiry the ALJ suggested be done over the employer’s e-mail system.
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mation supplied in an Excelsior list would radically alter their ability
to gain information about union representation. Other than the
dramatic difference it would make to employees due to more timely
receipt of section 7 information, it would have little or no effect on
the existing rules of nonemployee access to employer property
because organizers would not have to enter an employer’s property.103
2.

Internet Web Sites

The second readily available reform proposal is the use of Internet web sites at the inception of a campaign. The use of Internet web
sites in organizing campaigns is not a new idea; most international
unions and many locals have web sites.104 A union, with detailed
information specific to an employer, could create a web site, or a link,
for a particular group of employees to inform them of their section 7
right to representation.105 Problematic, however, is that no web site
can communicate section 7 information unless employees are given
notice of the web site’s existence. Employers should be required to
post conspicuous notices advising employees of a web site’s existence.
Further, if an employer has an e-mail system, it should allow a union
to send out a one-time notice through its corporate system advising
employees of the web site’s existence.106 An employer would still be
free to clarify its corporate Internet policy and, if appropriate, instruct
employees to only visit organizing sites during nonwork time, preferably at home. Additionally, employers could block access from
company computers to the organizing site by using the company’s

103. See supra notes 22–33 and accompanying text.
104. The AFL-CIO web site contains links to the sites of its affiliates. See
http://www.aflcio.org. The Communications Workers of America, and the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers have great organizing materials and links to the sites of
many of their locals. See http://www.cwa-union.org; http://www.ibew.org. The United Mine
Workers of America web site offers a map of the United States the user can click on to receive
organizational materials from the appropriate affiliate. See http://www.umwa.org.
105. SHOSTAK, supra note 87, at 43, 46–47 (offering similar suggestions in hypothetical
examples).
106. Peter DeChiara suggests that NLRA rights should be posted through government
mandated posters as is done for other workplace laws such as wage and hour protections,
workplace safety, and antidiscrimination laws. Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An
Argument for Informing Employees of Their Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 432 (1995). Alan Zmija proposes that the government publish and
distribute informational pamphlets advising workers of their NLRA rights as a counterbalance
to the rules of access. Alan L. Zmija, Union Organizing After Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.—A
Time to Reexamine the Rule of Babcock & Wilcox, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. & Emp. L.J. 65, 132
(1994). The reform suggested in the Note could achieve some of the benefits of both proposals
through an electronic notice procedure.
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firewall. By simply giving notice of a web site, many of the rules
constituting the current access doctrine could be rendered unnecessary because the union could conduct a substantial amount of its
section 7 protected communication without having to set foot on the
employer’s property.
A variation of this proposal may already be occurring in the retail industry where organizers “blitz” an establishment with printed
cards directing employees to a web site the employee might find of
interest.107 Posting notice of an organizing web site could promote online discussion and debate,108 while simultaneously eliminating the
need for section 7 rights to be covertly communicated to workers
through the “blitz” approach. By adopting a web site notice procedure, employees would benefit from a discussion about the section 7
right to representation and employers could avoid having nonemployee organizers on their property.109
C.

Eliminating the Geographic Limits of Excelsior

Excelsior recognized that it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain contact information for all members of a bargaining unit because
“in the absence of employer disclosure, a list of names and addresses
is extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain.”110 Yet mere possession of Excelsior information is often not enough to result in an
informed electorate. A name and address will not help a great deal in
situations where employees do not live close together, such as in
suburban settings. The dissemination of section 7 information is also
frustrated when the Board makes a bargaining unit determination
beyond that for which contact information was supplied in an Excelsior list.111

107. SHOSTAK, supra note 87, at 47.
108. Professor Bierman suggests incorporating workplace debates as part of an extensive
overhaul of the representation election. See Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 33–34; Gely
& Bierman, supra note 3, at 183. While in-person debates would likely be more informative and
accurate, there is no indication that they would be readily adopted as a reform. Facilitating a
web site notice proposal could achieve some of the benefits of a debate reform as it can easily
evolve into a less intrusive “cyber-debate.”
109. In addition to retail workers, hospital workers are also under constraining access rules.
The proposed reform would prove useful in informing them of their section 7 right to representation. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
110. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1241 (1966).
111. Either party to an election can petition to obtain clarification of a bargaining unit. THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 5, at 411–12. The power to determine the “appropriate”
unit ultimately rests with the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2002).
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Critics of the home visits doctrine argue that, as a balance, Excelsior has increasingly become ineffective because workers are becoming more decentralized.112 “[T]he home visits doctrine appears to be
based on a model of economic life that suggests that employees live in
close proximity to the workplace.”113 Even the Babcock Court gave
considerable weight to the fact that the employees lived in small
towns within a hundred miles of the work site.114 No longer can there
be the presumption that a workforce operates from a central location,
lives in a nearby small town, or even reports to work at all because
many workers can now work from home.115 Yet the doctrines of
access and Excelsior continue to operate under such paradigms. The
introduction of private e-mail and Internet web sites into representation elections would lessen the gap in access created by a suburbanized, decentralized workforce.
Another impasse in communication occurs when bargaining units
are large or when they are expanded beyond the scope that a union
canvassed with section 7 information. This can present a huge
obstacle to organizers who must reach large numbers of employees in
a short time. The Act states that the extent of union organizing shall
not be determinative of whether a unit is appropriate.116 Although
the power ultimately rests with the Board, some employers use the
unit clarification petition as a defeat tactic with the understanding
that it is harder to organize a larger or modified unit.117 Examining
this trend, Bronfenbrenner concludes that when other variables are
controlled, “the probability of the union winning an election declines
by as much as 15% when the unit is changed after the petition is
filed.”118 Adopting the reform suggested in this Note would facilitate
better communication with larger units and render a petition to
increase unit size a useless employer tactic. Unions would have better
opportunities to communicate section 7 rights to all employees
determined to be in a larger or expanded bargaining unit.

112. Gely & Bierman, supra note 3, at 155–57.
113. Id. at 156 (citing Babcock and stating that the Lechmere court “flatly refused to
consider the present day context in which the access question arose”).
114. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 106–07 (1956).
115. Broder, supra note 10, at 1639–42 (stating that “going to work” may be an “early
casualty of the Digital Revolution”).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c)(5).
117. SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT, supra note 49, at 217.
118. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 98, at 78–80.
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D. Additional Improvements to Excelsior and Access
1.

Privacy

The home visits doctrine requires employees to sacrifice some
level of privacy and autonomy in favor of their employer’s property
rights.119 Providing unions with private e-mail addresses or giving
notice of a web site would enable an employee to determine the
forum of campaign contact, be it face-to-face, on the telephone, or in
electronic format. If an employee indicates that electronic contact is
preferred, then a home visit or a telephone call could be avoided.
Employees could be assured of receiving section 7 information
without having to sacrifice their home privacy in favor of their
employers’ property interests.
2.

Employee Self-Determination

In addition to protecting employee privacy in the home through
a decreased emphasis on home visits and telephone calls, this proposed reform also allows an employee to regulate the actual amount
of electronic communication received. The employee who disfavors
representation will not likely respond to the one-time use option.
Furthermore, when contacted through private e-mail supplied in an
employer provided list, the employee who disfavors representation
may advise the sender of his or her adverse position and thwart future
contact by “blocking” messages from the account.120 Both the use of
private e-mail and an informational web site would improve the
position of the employee in organizing efforts because an undecided
employee, and one who favors a union’s message, will have more
timely information for their decision. In contrast, an employee who
resents the presence of organizers will be better able to control the
flow of information.
3.

The Image of a Competent Representative

Section 7 gives employees a right to the representation of their
choice. Those unaware of this right become knowledgeable through a
119. This is Professor Bierman’s principal argument against continuation of the home visits
doctrine because he perceives it to be an invasion of the home. Bierman, Home Visits, supra
note 9; Bierman, Reply, supra note 9; Gely & Bierman, supra note 3. The proposal in this Note
would serve to ease some of Bierman’s concerns about protecting home privacy.
120. Most e-mail systems can be set to block messages from a sender.
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union seeking to be their representative. A positive image is not
conveyed if an entity seeking to act as a representative must stand in
traffic and wave a sign to communicate with certain employees.
Aside from the actual loss of section 7 information during its transmission in this manner, the psychological impact of such a transaction
undoubtedly taints what information is absorbed. Technological
reforms could reinforce the union’s position of competently representing the employee’s interest.
The current practice of excluding nonemployee union organizers
from employer property places additional value on the employer’s
message because the right to exclude organizers is equal to an atwork silencing of the union’s message.121 The value of giving information to the employee about section 7 rights is, by implication, viewed
as subordinate to the right of the employer to exclude the organizer.122
This image is not consistent with accommodating the interests of all
parties as set forth in Babcock.123
If, through reforms similar to those proposed in this Note, organizers are able to present a strong image, as one on par with the
employer, then employee section 7 rights will more likely come to
fruition. The employer could remain sovereign over its property
while not lessening the image of the union as a competent representative. The union could have some level of balance in access, and
employees would receive timely information about their choice for
workplace representation.
4.

Correcting the “Too Little, Too Late” Problem

The web site notice proposal or the use of private e-mail addresses can both be utilized to correct the “too little, too late” problem which, according to Professor Bierman, is inherent in the
Excelsior doctrine.124 Congress or the Board could require an employer to post the notice of an organizing web site, or send out a onetime e-mail, when a bona fide union expresses interest in organizing a
workforce. As such, the “balance” of the Excelsior doctrine could be
achieved through extension into the prepetition stages of an election.
121. White, supra note 9, at 150 (“[o]n a subjective level, the fact that a union is forced to
campaign outside company property may have an important effect on election outcomes,
because it influences how the union is perceived by the targeted employees”).
122. Id.
123. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
124. Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9, at 9–10; Gely & Bierman, supra note 3, at 180;
White, supra note 9.
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This extension could achieve balance without major disruption to the
existing doctrine of property access because employees could receive
notice of their section 7 rights without the need for nonemployee
union organizers to enter the property of employers.
III. CASE EXAMPLE: TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SOLUTIONS125
Technology Services Solutions (“Technology Services”) is a series
of administrative rulings and Board decisions involving the same
employer and Local 111 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.126 This set of rulings illustrates the need for technological reform in representation elections and, as such, requires closer
examination into the context of extending the Excelsior doctrine to
include private e-mail addresses.127 The situation that gave rise to
Technology Services was a function of a decentralized work force and
the resulting geographic obstacles to organizing, combined with the
problem of an expanded bargaining unit.128
A. Background
Originally, two Colorado-based bargaining units of sixty-three
computer service technicians participated in a representation election.129 The employer requested a modification to the bargaining unit
and the Board found that the appropriate unit130 consisted of one

125. Malin, Perritt, and Wilcox examine this case to prove the point that the Board has just
begun the long task of incorporating technology into the representation election. Malin &
Perritt, supra note 10, at 22–24, 33, 37, 50–52; Wilcox, supra note 10, at 266 (suggesting private
e-mail will be an issue, yet not examining it as a reform proposal).
126. Technology Services has been before the Board three times and been twice remanded
to the ALJ for reconsideration. The initial Board decision, at 324 N.L.R.B. 298, was remanded
to an ALJ and critiqued by commentators. See Malin & Perritt, supra note 10, at 50–52. Since
that commentary, the case was remanded to the ALJ and the Board partially affirmed that
ruling. 332 N.L.R.B., No. 100, slip op. at 1 (Oct. 31, 2000). Most recently, the union filed a
motion to modify the notice procedure resulting from the partial victory won in the second
Board decision. 334 N.L.R.B., No. 18, slip op. at 1 (May 24, 2001).
127. As previously discussed, there are many ways for technology to reform representation
elections. While private e-mail addresses represents one solution, other technology proposals
could possibly work just as effectively.
128. 332 N.L.R.B. 1., No. 100, slip op. at 2.
129. Id.
130. Section 159(b) states that “to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by [the Act],” the Board is to determine in each case what is an appropriate
unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2000). The proviso of section 159(b) prohibits the inclusion of
professional employees within a unit of nonprofessional employees, the disruption of a prior
Board determination of appropriateness, and the inclusion of guards within a unit of employees
not obligated to protect an employer’s property. Id. Other than these guidelines, the Board is
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covering all of the employer’s 236 employees in its south-central
region, which covered the expanse of eight states.131 The union and
the General Counsel invoked, by analogy, the inaccessibility exception to the general access rule of Lechmere and requested an Excelsior type list of the names and addresses of the new members of the
expanded unit.132 The Board denied the request stating that the
General Counsel “fell short of proving his contention that the Union
had no reasonable means of communicating with the bargaining unit
employees unless [provided with the list].”133
The Board affirmed the ruling of the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) who made suggestions in his decision as to how the union
organizer could have communicated with the expanded unit. In doing
so, he reasoned that if the organizer had employed his suggested
methods, there would have been no need to invoke the exception to
Lechmere.134 The ALJ stated that the organizer should have asked
more of the original unit members, such as whether they had the
names or contact information for employees elsewhere in the region.135 He also suggested that the organizer should have made more
extensive use of a particular prounion employee to solicit over an
employer’s e-mail system.136 His final suggestion was that the organizer should have made contacts through the prounion employees who
had some face-to-face contact during training sessions or at times
when they visited centralized service facilities.137
B.

A Technological Solution to Technology Services

Manifest in Technology Services was the great lengths to which
the Board was willing to go in avoiding an extension of Excelsior into
the prepetition stage of the campaign.138 Professors Martin Malin and
Henry Perritt surmised of the first Technology Services decision that,
given wide discretion to make the determination of an appropriate unit on a case by case basis.
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 5, at 448–50.
131. Tech. Servs., 332 N.L.R.B., No. 100, slip op. at 2. The unit determination was made in
an unpublished opinion. The unit was expanded to include Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and parts of Nebraska and Wyoming.
132. Id. at 2.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 22–28.
135. Id. at 4.
136. Id. at 14.
137. Id. at 15–17, 24–27.
138. The impending need to address e-mail, the Internet, and decentralized workforce
organizing was also avoided.
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in the absence of Excelsior information for the entire unit, the alternatives left to the union by the ALJ’s decision would have solicitation
occurring either via the employer’s computer system or during work
time.139 This critique signals caution because an employer faced with
organizing methods such as these will likely raise a challenge to
prevent unions from traipsing over its ostensible property rights in its
computer systems and seek to prevent the solicitation of workers
during work time.140
Implementation of a reform such as the one proposed in this
Note would remedy some of the inconsistency in the Technology
Services situation. Providing the organizer with the private e-mail
address of the original unit of employees would have enabled the
organizer to communicate effectively with a decentralized workforce
and the expanded unit, while allowing the existing constraining
property rights regime to remain unchanged.141 By utilizing private email addresses or having the employer give notice of a web site to its
entire workforce, an organizer could likely communicate with an
expanded unit without employing methods involving an employer’s email system or forcing work time solicitation.
C.

The Other Reasonable Means Exception

Not only does Technology Services provide a case for adding private e-mail addresses to the Excelsior doctrine and using web site
notices, it also offers an opportunity to examine the limits of technological reform. Not every worker will have access to the Internet and
using new methods of communication could run the risk of further
limiting the “other reasonable means to communication” exception to
the Babcock-Lechmere doctrine.142 The Board and courts may
surmise that, because unions have an electronic method of communicating with employees, preserving traditional methods is no longer
necessary.
139. Malin & Perritt, supra note 10, at 52. Their article provides an extensive examination
of the ALJ’s rulings and the Board’s review of them. Such detail is not warranted in this Note.
Subsequent rulings remain consistent on the points critiqued, in that they leave much room for
controversy.
140. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 5, at 87–94, 98–104, for a discussion of
these blackletter doctrines regarding access and solicitation.
141. The employees of Technology Services Solutions were computer service representatives and many were former employees of IBM; it is highly probable that many if not most of
these employees had a private e-mail account, or could have easily created one. Tech. Servs.,
332 N.L.R.B., No. 100, slip op. at 2.
142. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
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Even with the potential introduction of technology into the representation election, there should be no further limit placed on
nonemployee access or the exception. As widely popular as e-mail
and the Internet are, it would be foolish to assume that all workers
will have access to,143 or will use, these mediums.144 Unions may stand
to gain some degree of access to a certain percentage of workers
through the use of private e-mail and web site notice. However, just
because unions would stand to gain a new method of contact they
should not be prevented from using traditional methods. For example, e-mail, like a phone call, must be received to be effective and,
thus, its availability should not supplant doctrines that uphold face-toface contact. 145
As for the exception doctrine, Lechmere itself leaves little room
for the Babcock exception to survive and, after Technology Services,
it is now hard to imagine further limitations on organizing than those
suggested in that decision. Thus, as a practical matter, even further
limiting the Babcock-Lechmere exception may not result in any more
harm to employee section 7 rights. Using private e-mail addresses
and Internet web sites would practically help workers receive more
section 7 information while running the risk of further narrowing an
unhelpful exception.
IV. CONCLUSION
This reform proposal does not solve the problem of the whole,
but lessens the harm to the parts, in that more information is disseminated while giving extreme deference to an employer’s interest in
property. Forcing unions to work with limited methods of communi143. See CENSUS REPORT, supra note 83. The Census statistics cite considerable differences
in Internet access and computer ownership for different races. For example, Caucasians and
Asian and Pacific Islanders reported 57.7% and 66% usage rates, respectively; however,
African-Americans only reported 37% and Hispanics reported 35.3%. Id. at 7 tbl. C “Access to
a Home Computer and use of the Internet at Home by Adults 18 Years and Over: August
2000.”
144. Not all Americans readily adopt new technology. It took more than thirty years for
televisions to reach the current 98% penetration rate among U.S. households and telephones
lingered at 35% from 1920 to 1950 until finally reaching 90% in the 1970s. However, the
Internet, now around 57%, has grown faster than many technologies. See Angwin, supra note
83.
145. Miles Macik argues that e-mail should not be characterized as solicitation or distribution and should be completely taken out of the Lechmere/Babcock context. Miles Macik,
“You’ve Got Mail.” A Look at the Application of the Solicitation and Distribution Rules of the
National Labor Relations Board to the Use of E-mail in Union Organizing Drives, 78 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 591, 613–15 (2001).
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cation serves no party’s interest, except that of an employer hostile to
union organizing. The addition of private e-mail addresses and web
site notice postings into the current regime would reflect the needs of
contemporary society and do little injury to existing doctrine, save a
more informed electorate.
At its inception, the Board stated that it would defer reconsideration of the rules of access to employees with section 7 information
until the “effects of Excelsior become known.”146 After standing
unchanged for more than three decades—the effects are known.
Excelsior fails to provide section 7 information to employees or
balance nonemployee access.147 For the sake of American workers, it
is time for reform. A situation such as Technology Services will
undoubtedly arise again and the Board must not stand down from the
opportunity to embrace new modes of communication as a way to
more fully effectuate the right of employees to receive information
about their right to workplace representation.
It has been said that “[t]he reasonable [person] adapts to the
world: the unreasonable [person] persists in trying to adapt the world
to [him or herself]. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable [person].”148 If it is reasonable for union organizers to effectuate
the section 7 rights of workers by adapting to the suggestion that they
advise workers of the right to representation while standing on
narrow strips of grass found between lanes of rushing traffic—then no
progress is to be made in this area. Yet, if Congress, the Board, and
reviewing courts succumb to the voice of the “unreasonable” person
who insists that the same information can be communicated in a more
respectable manner—then representation elections will progress into
the twenty-first Century with dignity.

146. General Electric Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247, 1251 (1966).
147. E.g., Bierman, Home Visits, supra note 9; Gely & Bierman, supra note 3; White, supra
note 9.
148. George Bernard Shaw, Maxims for Revolutionists, in MAN AND SUPERMAN 729, 739
(Dodd, Mead & Company 1962) (1903). In keeping with progress, an alteration of this quote
required the use of inclusive language.

